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Re-stating Party Development 
in Central and Eastern Europe: 
A Response
CONOR O’DWYER*
University of Florida, Gainesville
I would like to begin by thanking Seán Hanley for his perceptive and stimulat-
ing reading of these books. For me, it is still surprising that two books that were 
conceived, researched, and written independently could speak so directly to 
each other in so many respects. There are divergences and differences of opinion, 
naturally, but as Hanley’s review skilfully shows, even the seeming disconnects 
between accounts may in many cases actually highlight cross-cutting dynamics 
in the complex and sprawling process of state-building. Perhaps, however, the 
dialogue between these books is not as surprising as it ﬁ rst appears. Theorising 
about the development of the state was largely (and inexplicably) a neglected 
aspect of the monumental political and economic changes after the fall of com-
munism. Analyses of the post-communist state were, for the most part, applied 
in nature, not comparative in a theory-building sense. In the past few years this 
has changed, with several new studies appearing besides the ones reviewed here 
[Ganev 2007; Kopecký 2007; Gehlbach 2008]. I expect the debates to continue and 
to deepen – which is for the good. This is how the ﬁ eld moves forward. 
Hanley makes many trenchant and constructive observations, drawing con-
nections that push both works in new research directions. Rather than focus point 
by point on Hanley’s remarks, however, I would prefer to address my response to 
a few broad themes that span both books. 
How to compare states
Every political scientist or political sociologist agrees that the state is of paramount 
importance, but after that, it seems, the consensus breaks down. It sometimes 
seems that the wealth of literature on the state constitutes our own academic ver-
sion of the resource curse. If the state is so central and its inﬂ uence so pervasive, 
where do we draw the boundaries and distinctions necessary for comparative 
analysis? How should we deﬁ ne the state? What makes one state more effective 
than another? Supposing we can agree on these issues in principle, how shall we 
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proceed in comparing and classifying real, existing specimens? What measures 
shall we use? 
These are the questions that Anna Grzymała-Busse and I both confronted 
when we began the research that developed, respectively, into Rebuilding Levi-
athan and Runaway State-building. We each faced decisions about these various 
trade-offs, and, as the reviewer observes, we came up with sometimes similar, 
sometimes different strategies for resolving them. One unintended beneﬁ t of this 
new wave of research into the evolution of the state after communism may be to 
prompt reﬂ ection on what constitutes the irreducible core of the state (at least 
for the purposes of comparative analysis) and how we should measure the state 
capacity of that core. Having grappled with these decisions, however, I rather 
doubt that any such consensus will emerge. That statement does not reﬂ ect any 
pessimism about the possibility of progress in the study of the state. It is simply 
a recognition that these decisions are not choices between right and wrong but 
rather trade-offs between analytical depth and breadth under the constraints im-
posed by the costs of gathering data. When concepts are difﬁ cult to measure, it is 
often more advantageous to use small-N, qualitative techniques; such techniques, 
of course, also have drawbacks of their own. 
The depth-breadth trade-off is most evident in the problem of measuring pa-
tronage. Because it has the taint of the abuse of power (not to mention moral cor-
ruption), patronage politics poses very direct problems for measurement. It seems 
that the proverbial ‘man in the street’ in every post-communist country believes 
his politicians and ofﬁ cials are corrupt. While this is certainly an indication of the 
character of state-building after communism, in order to make comparisons about 
the culture of the state administration and the practices of political parties, I chose 
to survey the opinions of people who had direct knowledge about them. This 
necessitated in-depth, semi-structured, elite interviews with representative, if not 
random, sampling. Even recognising the possibilities for bias in such interviews, 
I believe they gave the most valid picture of the multifaceted issue of bureaucratic 
practice and politicisation of the state. The problem is that such interviews do 
not scale well to large random samples of the sort that would support statistical 
analysis. On the other hand, practical and methodological problems beset large 
random samples on this topic: the difﬁ culty of sampling administrative elites, the 
complexities of discussing a charged topic like patronage, to name just two. This is 
an inescapable dilemma, and my decision was to focus on a few countries where I 
could achieve in-depth and nuanced measurement of a complex concept. 
Recognising the depth-breadth trade-off does not, of course, eliminate the 
risk around any particular compromise along its poles. To minimise that risk, in 
Runaway State-building I compared my assessments of state capacity and profes-
sionalisation with third-party measures such as the World Bank’s ‘Governance 
Matters’ indicators. Following a mixed-method strategy, the book also probed 
other areas of state-building, such as the welfare state and regional decentralisa-
tion: did the picture there match the relationship between political parties and 
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the state that I found in the administration? As Hanley notes, I also ‘scaled up’ 
the comparative analysis in one of the ﬁ nal chapters of the book, testing the hy-
potheses developed in the country case studies against other post-communist 
countries, as well as new democracies in other regions. According to Hanley, my 
large-N analysis contained debatable coding choices for some countries’ party 
systems, most notably Slovenia’s. I am happy to learn that, in Hanley’s opinion, I 
miscoded Slovenia. Rather than being an anomalous case of a weak governance 
system with high state capacity, as I took it for, it is actually a responsible party 
system and, so, its high governance scores actually support my argument. 
The larger methodological point here is important, though. In scaling my 
argument to include so many different party systems across regions and time, 
streamlined coding rules were needed and had to be applied conservatively. 
When faced with borderline cases such as Slovenia, I coded them ‘against’ the 
preferred hypothesis. As I note in the book, Slovenia’s electoral volatility, one 
of my primary coding criteria, was only moderately high in the period under 
consideration, but it was noticeably higher than in responsible party systems like 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. Moreover, unlike the other responsible party 
system in the region, Estonia, it was not declining over time. In the interests of 
consistent and conservative coding, therefore, Slovenia was coded as a weak gov-
ernance system for the statistical analysis. 
The problem of comparing state growth across countries provides another 
illustration of the depth-breadth trade-off. As others have noted, cross-national 
comparisons of state employment data should always be treated with caution; 
ofﬁ cial categories and counting methods both tend to differ by country. To under-
stand the nuance and complexities of the data, I opted to construct comparable 
categories for just three countries in consultation with experts in their national 
statistical ofﬁ ces. Attempting a similar task on the scale of even the nine coun-
tries in Grzymała-Busse’s study would be exceedingly difﬁ cult. It was for these 
reasons again that, in my chapter of broader cross-national analysis in Eastern 
Europe and beyond, I left state growth out of the analysis, focusing instead on the 
World Bank’s measures of state performance. 
Finally, the different territorial dimensions of the state (central, regional, 
district, and local) add yet another level of complexity to the study of the state. 
Runaway State-building sought to exploit this internal variation for additional ana-
lytical leverage, using it to probe political culture as an alternative explanation for 
how states develop. If the dynamics of state development differ internally (that 
is, at different levels of a state’s territorial administration), it would be difﬁ cult, 
I argued, to invoke national administrative culture as an explanation. As Hanley 
suggests, there is a complicating factor here. State expansion at the local level was 
conditioned by municipal consolidations that had occurred under communism, 
consolidations that were undone in a wave of municipal secessionism in the early 
1990s (RSB: 136–137). Ideally, one could assess the role of patronage politics at the 
local level by separating out personnel expansion resulting from the sheer growth 
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in the number of municipalities – for example, by comparing personnel statistics 
in breakaway vs. non-breakaway municipalities. I did not have this level of data, 
but even the data I had suggested that the expansion of local state personnel, 
where it occurred, was not simply a function of growth in the number of munici-
palities. First, there is the issue of timing. While the vast majority of municipal se-
cessions occurred between 1989 and 1992, the trend of personnel expansion was 
constant throughout the 1990s (RSB: 211). Second, while the trend of municipal 
secessionism was far less pronounced in Poland, it had comparable rates of local-
level personnel growth as the Czech Republic. Finally, the case of Slovakia, which 
also experienced municipal secessionism in the early 1990s but saw a decrease in 
the number of local state personnel, shows that personnel growth is not necessar-
ily just a function of growth in the number of municipalities. 
Party system institutionalisation and patronage politics
Party competition is the second area where these books manage to simultane-
ously overlap and diverge. Both posit that party competition is crucial to con-
straining state politicisation, but what kind of party competition? This dialogue 
on what constitutes robust party competition stands as perhaps the most fruitful 
contribution of the books as a pair. Hanley meticulously summarises the argu-
ments on both sides; I would simply repeat that my overarching emphasis is on 
party system institutionalisation as a means of generating vertical accountability. 
Institutionalisation leads to parties with longer time horizons and provides vot-
ers with more manageable, meaningful choices at election time. Party compe-
tition in the absence of party system institutionalisation cannot be expected to 
constrain patronage politics; on the contrary, it may exacerbate it, as heterogene-
ous government coalitions substitute patronage for ideological coherence to keep 
their partners on board. 
In the time since both books were written, events on the ground, in the 
case of Poland at least, present the opportunity to re-examine the relationship be-
tween party competition and state-building directly. Poland’s experience under 
the Kaczyńskis’ government of 2005–2007 is instructive for a number of reasons. 
First, it vividly illustrates the dangers that underinstitutionalised party competi-
tion poses for state-building. Second, it shows again the pitfalls of taking ‘admin-
istrative reform’ at face value. Administrative reform is often less about ending 
politicisation of the state than it is a means for disrupting extant party-state rela-
tionships in the hope of replacing them with new ones. Third, this episode allows 
us to reassess our analytical framework to reﬂ ect a political environment that has, 
as Hanley suggests, been reshaped both by European Union membership and the 
rise of illiberal populist political parties. 
The 2005 parliamentary elections in Poland revealed a party system that, 
though undeniably competitive, is still in deep ﬂ ux – marked by high volatility, 
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unpredictable coalition-making, and low barriers to entry. The incumbent post-
communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which had won some 40% of the vote 
in the previous elections, imploded. Two relatively new parties, the Kaczyńskis’ 
Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform (PO), captured most of the vote. During 
the campaign they were seen as natural coalition partners, with PO expected to 
be the senior coalition partner. Instead, PiS eked out a narrow victory over PO 
and, contrary to expectations, eventually formed a government with two radi-
cal populist parties, the left-agrarian Self-Defence (SO) and the ultra-nationalist, 
ultra-Catholic League of Polish Families (LPR). In many respects, it was a gov-
ernment of political outsiders, comprising parties that differed sharply in key 
programmatic respects but which did share an overall sense of retaking politics 
from a corrupted political elite. 
It was under these conditions, reliant on the support of recently established 
parties with differing programs but eager to take advantage of the perquisites of 
government, that Law and Justice undertook its mission to combat corruption and 
cleanse the Polish state of, in its view, the lingering inﬂ uence of communist col-
laborators and agents. It sought to build a ‘Fourth Republic’, to be distinguished 
from, again in its view, the communist-infused governments that had followed 
from the Round Table agreement in 1989. The goals and language recalled those of 
Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS) in 1997, but in many ways the project, of which 
‘civil service reform’ was inevitably a part, seemed even more expansive. 
Runaway State-building argued that repeated civil service reforms under dif-
ferent governments in an under-institutionalised party system serve as a better 
indicator of patronage-infused state-building than of real civil service reform. 
In August 2006, the PiS-led government enacted Poland’s third major civil serv-
ice reform since 1989. As in previous rounds of reform, this latest version was a 
fundamental restructuring of the system from basic principles. It thereby gave 
the governing coalition a free hand to restructure the relationships and networks 
forged in the state administration under previous governments. It is worth not-
ing that Poland was under absolutely no pressure to enact this reform from the 
EU. (Indeed, given the Kaczyńskis’ rhetoric about the EU, one cannot help but 
wonder, half-seriously, whether such pressure would not have dissuaded them 
from the project.) 
Whereas the system adopted in 1998 had attempted, albeit with limited suc-
cess, to create a career civil service on the French model, the 2006 reform cen-
tralised the most important stafﬁ ng decisions in the Ofﬁ ce of the Prime Minister 
and either eliminated or weakened independent oversight institutions. The new 
system put an end to the goal of a civil service independent from the government, 
and it largely undid the idea of deﬁ ning professionalising career-paths for ofﬁ -
cials. Instead, it maximised the discretion of the Prime Minister’s ofﬁ ce in ﬁ lling 
state appointments, while abolishing the Ofﬁ ce of the Civil Service and the Chief 
and Vice-Chief of the Civil Service. Rather than reserving the most important 
state posts for members of the civil service, as before, the reform created a ‘state 
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stafﬁ ng pool’ from which candidates could be drawn to ﬁ ll any top state post. 
Ironically, criticism by independent organisations and policy experts of the fail-
ures of implementation in the 1998 law provided much of the rationale for the 
2006 restructuring. Yet, in my conversations with representatives of these organi-
sations in summer 2007, they tended see the new system as deepening the state’s 
politicisation, noting that the centralisation of appointment powers in the Ofﬁ ce 
of the Prime Minister enhanced the government’s capacity to reward supporters 
with state positions. 
Certainly, the wave of scandals that characterised the Fourth Republic’s brief 
reign suggests that the link between party inﬂ uence and state administration re-
mains uncomfortably close. The agrarian populist Self Defence, in particular, was 
accused of aggressively placing its activists in ministries and state ofﬁ ces under 
its control. Its leader, Andrzej Lepper, publicly exhorted his party leadership to 
employ party activists in state institutions wherever they could, proclaiming at a 
party congress, ‘That’s why we’re in the coalition, so that we can employ our cad-
res’ [Quoted in Kącki 2007d]. Where there were not enough positions for party 
loyalists, new positions were created [Kącki 2007b]. In one such scandal, a jour-
nalist challenged a Self Defence parliamentarian accused of illegally promoting 
party activists in the state, ‘Shouldn’t state ofﬁ cials be politically independent?’ 
The parliamentarian replied, ‘SLD [the post-communist party] did the same thing 
[when it was in power]’ [Quoted in Kącki 2007c]. In May 2007, evidence emerged 
that, in addition to ﬁ lling the administration with loyalists, it was the party’s 
policy to demand 5–7% of the salary of such appointees – paid into the Agricul-
tural Trade Union ‘Self Defence’, founded by Andrzej Lepper [Kącki 2007a]. The 
use of patronage was most glaring (even unabashed) with Self Defence, but sub-
sequent reporting suggested that it was not alone in such practices. Even parties 
like PO, which cultivates a reputation for policy expertise, professionalism, and 
liberalism, had party resolutions requesting ‘obligatory donations’ from persons 
fulﬁ lling public functions ‘on the recommendation of PO’ [Zieliński 2007]. 
In July 2007, a corruption scandal in the Ministry of Agriculture prompted 
Andrzej Lepper’s (SO) dismissal from the cabinet. Premier Kaczyński announced 
that ending political corruption would be a precondition for the continuance of 
the coalition. Interestingly, Kaczyński’s language in a letter to his coalition part-
ners seemed to acknowledge that the problem of patronage plagued all of the 
governing parties: ‘The criteria for recruitment into the state administration and 
public institutions must be exclusively meritocratic. It is necessary to relinquish 
immediately the ongoing – especially in the course of the last few weeks – prac-
tice of nepotism in some state agencies. This principle applies in equal measure 
to all coalition partners’ [‘Treść listu…’ 2007].
I dwell on Poland’s recent experience because, while I appreciate Hanley’s 
suggestion that we remain open to the possibility of emergent new inﬂ uences in 
East Central Europe’s ongoing state-building, I believe that this experience shows 
the continued relevance of the party competition perspectives laid out in both 
Conor O’Dwyer: Re-stating Party Development in Central and Eastern Europe: A Response
1187
books. Undeniably, the impact of the European Union is much more immediate 
than it was in the 1990s. It is also true that the rise of illiberal populists since 2004 
represents an important new development in the region’s political development 
[Ost 2005; Vanhuysse 2008]. Yet, as Poland’s experience indicates, the EU is still 
far from determinative for the course of state-building. One might even argue 
that the EU’s inﬂ uence will be less important as time goes on because the post-
communist states are no longer subject to the close monitoring and conditionality 
that they were before membership. 
The surge of populism that has occurred in much of East Central Europe 
since around 2004 prompts Hanley to wonder about relevance of the responsi-
ble party model of institutionalised competition for the future. The deeper ques-
tion is: what is the connection between illiberal populism and state-building, and 
does this phenomenon signal the need for new theory? First, there is no denying 
that the language of illiberal populism – with its exhortations to take politics back 
from a corrupt elite and restore it to the ‘people’ – can form the pretext for dis-
ruptive and politicised interventions into the state administration. In Poland, the 
Kaczyńskis’ successful electoral campaign was premised on smashing the ‘układ’, 
a nebulously deﬁ ned network of corrupt politicians, ofﬁ cials, and former com-
munists. As described above, once in power PiS undertook a massive ‘reform’ of 
the state, which in the eyes of most experts only further politicised it. One could 
also argue that the Kaczyńskis’ electoral success was premised on the failure of 
previous Polish governments to contain political corruption and patronage, lend-
ing credence in voters’ eyes to their crusade against the układ. 
The second part of the question is, however, whether a new theory of state-
building is needed for a new phase of populist politics in post-communist Europe. 
I would say no for a couple of reasons. First, it is still too early to judge just how 
long the current populist moment will endure. In Poland’s 2007 elections, Self 
Defence and the League of Polish Families failed to cross the minimum threshold 
for parliament. Second, while their language is perhaps more shrill than before, 
populists are not a new phenomenon in post-communist Europe, as Ost [2005] 
shows in Poland, or as was seen in Slovakia under Mečiar. But most importantly, 
I would argue for the continued relevance of an analytical framework based on 
party competition because the populist turn can be easily accommodated within 
that framework. Just as Mečiar’s populism destabilised Slovak politics in the pe-
riod covered in Runaway State-building, the appearance of illiberal populists can 
be conceptualised as a factor that impedes party system institutionalisation and, 
therefore, as a precipitant of runaway state-building. As party systems become 
more institutionalised, it becomes more difﬁ cult for populist parties, where they 
persist, to enter government and to leverage their coalition-making potential for 
political beneﬁ ts. It may be, as Hanley suggests, that populism will make the 
responsible party pattern harder to achieve, but persistent under-institutionalisa-
tion and politicised state-building is, sadly, an outcome that is perfectly conso-
nant with the theoretical framework. 
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For East Central Europe, the fall of communism in 1989 was the sort of rare 
sharp shock that fundamentally transforms the forces at work in the usually 
slow-moving and history-laden processes of state-building and party system de-
velopment. Both of the books reviewed here recognised that, in the often chaotic 
developments that followed, there lay an opportunity to revisit core questions 
and assumptions in our understanding of both states and party competition. The 
region’s different state and party system trajectories are still far from set, and as 
Hanley observes, both books ‘shy away’ from explicit policy prescriptions and 
speculation on ‘the future of the party-state’ (see p. 1173 of Seán Hanley’s review 
in this issue). That they do so is an implicit recognition of the ongoing ‘openness’ 
of this historical moment, an openness that may also serve as an invitation for 
further research. 
CONOR O’DWYER is Assistant Professor of Political Science and European Studies at the 
University of Florida. 
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